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ABSTRACT
Images today are increasingly shared online on social networking
sites such as Facebook, Flickr, Foursquare, and Instagram. Image
sharing occurs not only within a group of friends but also more and
more outside a user’s social circles for purposes of social discovery.
Despite that current social networking sites allow users to change
their privacy preferences, this is often a cumbersome task for the
vast majority of users on the Web, who face difficulties in assigning
and managing privacy settings. When these privacy settings are
used inappropriately, online image sharing can potentially lead to
unwanted disclosures and privacy violations. Thus, automatically
predicting images’ privacy to warn users about private or sensitive
content before uploading these images on social networking sites
has become a necessity in our current interconnected world.
In this paper, we explore learning models to automatically pre-
dict appropriate images’ privacy as private or public using carefully
identified image-specific features. We study deep visual semantic
features that are derived from various layers of Convolutional Neu-
ral Networks (CNNs) as well as textual features such as user tags
and deep tags generated from deep CNNs. Particularly, we extract
deep (visual and tag) features from four pre-trained CNN architec-
tures for object recognition, i.e., AlexNet, GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and
ResNet, and compare their performance for image privacy predic-
tion. Among all four networks, we observe that ResNet produces
the best feature representations for this task. We also fine-tune the
pre-trained CNN architectures on our privacy dataset and com-
pare their performance with the models trained on pre-trained
features. The results show that even though the overall perfor-
mance obtained using the fine-tuned networks is comparable to
that of pre-trained networks, the fine-tuned networks provide an
improved performance for the private class as compared to models
trained on the pre-trained features. Results of our experiments on a
Flickr dataset of over thirty thousand images show that the learning
models trained on features extracted from ResNet outperform the
state-of-the-art models for image privacy prediction. We further
investigate the combination of user tags and deep tags derived from
CNN architectures using two settings: (1) SVM on the bag-of-tags
features; and (2) text-based CNN. We compare these models with
the models trained on ResNet visual features obtained for privacy
prediction. Our results show that even though the models trained
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on the visual features perform better than those trained on the tag
features, the combination of deep visual features with image tags
shows improvements in performance over the individual feature
sets. Our code, features, and the dataset used in experiments are
available at https://github.com/ashwinitonge/deepprivate.git.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online image sharing through social networking sites such as Face-
book, Flickr, and Instagram is on the rise, and so is the sharing of
private or sensitive images, which can lead to potential threats to
users’ privacy when inappropriate privacy settings are used in these
platforms. Many users quickly share private images of themselves
and their family and friends, without carefully thinking about the
consequences of unwanted disclosure and privacy violations [Ah-
ern et al. 2007; Zerr et al. 2012b]. For example, it is common now to
take photos at cocktail parties and share them on social networking
sites without much hesitation. The smartphones facilitate the shar-
ing of photos virtually at any time with people all around the world.
These photos can potentially reveal a user’s personal and social
habits and may be used in the detriment of the photos’ owner.
Gross and Acquisti [2005] analyzed more than 4,000 Carnegie
Mellon University students’ Facebook profiles and outlined poten-
tial threats to privacy. The authors found that users often provide
personal information generously on social networking sites, but
they rarely change default privacy settings, which could jeopardize
their privacy. In a parallel study, Lipford et al. [2008] showed that,
although current social networking sites allow users to change their
privacy preferences, the vast majority of users on the Web face dif-
ficulties in assigning and managing privacy settings. Interestingly,
Orekondy et al. [2017] showed that, even when users change their
privacy settings to comply with their personal privacy preference,
they often misjudge the private information in images, which fails
to enforce their own privacy preferences. Not surprising, employ-
ers these days often perform background checks for their future
employees using social networks and about 8% of companies have
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private images
public images
Figure 1: Examples of images manually identified as private (left) and public (right).
already fired employees due to their inappropriate social media
content [Waters and Ackerman 2011]. A study carried out by the
Pew Research center reported that 11% of users of social networks
regret the posted content [Madden 2012]. The Director of the AI
Research at Facebook, Yann LeCun [2017] urges the development of
a digital assistant to warn people about private or sensitive content
before embarrassing photos are shared with everyone on social
networks.
Identifying private or sensitive content from images is inher-
ently difficult because images’ privacy is dependent on the owners’
personality traits and their level of awareness towards privacy. Still,
images’ privacy is not purely subjective, but generic patterns of
privacy exist. Consider, for example, the images shown in Figure 1,
which are manually annotated and consistently rated as private and
public by multiple annotators in a study conducted by Zerr et al.
[2012b,a]. Notice that the presence of people generally pinpoints
to private images, although this is not always true. For example,
an image of a musical band in concert is considered to be public.
Similarly, images with no people in them could be private, e.g.,
images with door keys, music notes, legal documents, or some-
one’s art are considered to be private. Indeed, Laxton et al. [2008]
described a “tele-duplication attack” that allows an adversary to
create a physical key duplicate simply from an image.
Researchers showed that generic patterns of images’ privacy can
be automatically identified when a large set of images are consid-
ered for analysis and investigated binary prediction models based
on user tags and image content features such as SIFT (Scale Invari-
ant Feature Transform) and RGB (Red Green Blue) [Squicciarini
et al. 2014, 2017a; Zerr et al. 2012b]. More recently, several stud-
ies [Tonge and Caragea 2015, 2016, 2018; Tran et al. 2016] started
to explore privacy frameworks that leverage the benefits of Con-
volutional Neural Networks (CNNs) for object recognition since,
intuitively, the objects present in images significantly impact im-
ages’ privacy (as can be seen from Figure 1). However, these studies
used only the AlexNet architecture of CNNs on small dataset sizes.
To date, many deep CNN architectures have been developed and
achieve state-of-the-art performance on object recognition. These
CNNs include GoogLeNet [Szegedy et al. 2014], VGG-16 [Simonyan
and Zisserman 2014], and ResNet [He et al. 2016a] (in addition to
AlexNet [Krizhevsky et al. 2012]). Towards this end, in this paper,
we present an extensive study to carefully identify the CNN archi-
tectures and features derived from these CNNs that can adequately
predict the class of an image as private or public. Our research is
motivated by the fact that increasingly, online users’ privacy is
routinely compromised by using social and content sharing ap-
plications [Zheleva and Getoor 2009]. Our models can help users
to better manage their participation in online image sharing sites
by identifying the sensitive content from the images so that it be-
comes easier for regular users to control the amount of personal
information that they share through these images.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We study deep visual semantic features and deep image
tags derived from CNN architectures pre-trained on the Im-
ageNet dataset and use them in conjunction with Support
Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers for image privacy predic-
tion. Specifically, we extract deep features from four success-
ful (pre-trained) CNN architectures for object recognition,
AlexNet, GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and ResNet and compare their
performance on the task of privacy prediction. Through care-
fully designed experiments, we find that ResNet produces the
best feature representations for privacy prediction compared
with the other CNNs.
• We fine-tune the pre-trained CNN architectures on our pri-
vacy dataset and use the softmax function to predict the
images’ privacy as public or private. We compare the fine-
tuned CNNs with the SVM models obtained on the features
derived from the pre-trained CNNs and show that, although
the overall performance obtained by the fine-tuned CNNs is
comparable to that of SVM models, the fine-tuned networks
provide improved recall for the private class as compared to
the SVM models trained on the pre-trained features.
• We show that the best feature representation produced by
ResNet outperforms several baselines for image privacy pre-
diction that consider CNN-based models and SVM models
trained on traditional visual features such as SIFT and global
GIST descriptor.
• Next, we investigate the combination of user tags and deep
tags derived from CNNs in two settings: (1) using SVM on
the bag-of-tags features; and (2) applying the text CNN [Kim
2014] on the combination of user tags and deep tags for
privacy prediction using the softmax function. We compare
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these models with the models trained on the most promis-
ing visual features extracted from ResNet (obtained from
our study) for privacy prediction. Our results show that the
models trained on the visual features perform better than
those trained on the tag features.
• Finally, we explore the combination of deep visual features
with image tags and show further improvement in perfor-
mance over the individual sets of features.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We summarize
prior work in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the problem
statement in details. Section 4 describes the image features obtained
from various CNNs for privacy prediction, whereas in Section 5,
we provide details about the dataset that we use to evaluate our
models. In Section 6, we present the experiments and describe the
experimental setting and results. We finish our analysis in Section 7,
wherewe provide a brief discussion of ourmain findings, interesting
applications of our work, future directions, and conclude the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Emerging privacy violations in social networks have started to at-
tract various researchers to this field [Zheleva and Getoor 2009].
Researchers also provided public awareness of privacy risks associ-
ated with images shared online [Henne et al. 2013; Xu et al. 2015].
Along this line, several works are carried out to study users’ pri-
vacy concerns in social networks, privacy decisions about sharing
resources, and the risk associated with them [Ghazinour et al. 2013;
Gross and Acquisti 2005; Ilia et al. 2015; Krishnamurthy and Wills
2008; Parra-Arnau et al. 2014; Parra-Arnau et al. 2012; Simpson
2008].
Moreover, several works on privacy analysis examined privacy
decisions and considerations in mobile and online photo sharing
[Ahern et al. 2007; Besmer and Lipford 2009; Gross and Acquisti
2005; Jones and O’Neill 2011]. For example, Ahern et al. [2007]
explored critical aspects of privacy such as users’ consideration for
privacy decisions, content and context based patterns of privacy
decisions, and how different users adjust their privacy decisions
and behavior towards personal information disclosure. The authors
concluded that applications that could support and influence users’
privacy decision-making process should be developed. Jones and
O’Neill [2011] reinforced the role of privacy-relevant image con-
cepts. For instance, the authors determined that people are more
reluctant to share photos capturing social relationships than photos
taken for functional purposes; certain settings such as work, bars,
concerts cause users to share less. Besmer and Lipford [2009] men-
tioned that users want to regain control over their shared content,
but meanwhile, they feel that configuring proper privacy settings
for each image is a burden.
More recent and related to our line of work are the automated
image privacy approaches that have been explored along four lines
of research: social group based approaches, in which users’ profiles
are used to partition the friends’ lists into multiple groups or circles,
and the friends from the same circle are assumed to share similar
privacy preferences; location-based approaches, in which location
contexts are used to control the location-based privacy disclosures;
tag-based approaches, in which tags are used for privacy setting
recommendations; and visual-based approaches, in which the visual
content of images is leveraged for privacy prediction.
Social group based approaches. Several works emerged to provide
the automated privacy decisions for images shared online based
on the social groups or circles [Bonneau et al. 2009a,b; Christin
et al. 2013; Danezis 2009; Fang and LeFevre 2010; Joshi and Zhang
2009; Kepez and Yolum 2016; Klemperer et al. 2012; Mannan and
van Oorschot 2008; Pesce et al. 2012; Petkos et al. 2015; Squicciarini
et al. 2012, 2015, 2009; Watson et al. 2015; Yuan et al. 2017; Zerr et al.
2012b]. For example, Christin et al. [2013] proposed an approach
to share content with the users within privacy bubbles. Privacy
bubbles represent the private sphere of the users and the access
to the content is provided by the bubble creator to people within
the bubble. Bonneau et al. [2009b] introduced the notion of pri-
vacy suites which recommend users a set of privacy settings that
“expert” users or the trusted friends have already established so
that ordinary users can either directly accept a setting or perform
minor modifications only. Fang and LeFevre [2010] developed a
privacy assistant to help users grant privileges to their friends. The
approach takes as input the privacy preferences for the selected
friends and then, using these labels, constructs a classifier to assign
privacy labels to the rest of the (unlabeled) friends based on their
profiles. Danezis [2009] generated privacy settings based on the
policy that the information produced within the social circle should
remain in that circle itself. Along these lines, Adu-Oppong et al.
[2008] obtained privacy settings by forming clusters of friends by
partitioning a user’s friends’ list. Yuan et al. [2017] proposed an
approach for context-dependent and privacy-aware photo sharing.
This approach uses the semantics of the photo and the requester’s
contextual information in order to define whether an access to the
photo will be granted or not at a certain context. These social group
based approaches mostly considered the user trustworthiness, but
ignored the image content sensitiveness, and thus, they may not
necessarily provide appropriate privacy settings for online images
as the privacy preferences might change according to sensitiveness
of the image content.
Location-based approaches. These approaches [Baokar 2016; Bilo-
grevic et al. 2016; Choi et al. 2017; Fisher et al. 2012; Freudiger et al.
2012; Friedland and Sommer 2010; Olejnik et al. 2017; Ravichandran
et al. 2009; Shokri et al. 2011; Toch 2014; Yuan et al. 2017; Zhao
et al. 2014] leverage geo-tags, visual landmarks and other loca-
tion contexts to control the location-based privacy disclosures. The
geo-tags can be provided manually via social tagging or by adding
location information automatically through the digital cameras or
smart-phones having GPS. The location can also be inferred by
identifying places from the shared images through the computer
vision techniques.
Tag-based approaches. Previous work in the context of tag-based
access control policies and privacy prediction for images [Apos-
tolova and Demner-Fushman 2009; De Choudhury et al. 2009; Klem-
perer et al. 2012; Kurtan and Yolum 2018; Mannan and van Oorschot
2008; Pesce et al. 2012; Ra et al. 2013; Squicciarini et al. 2012, 2015,
2017b; Vyas et al. 2009; Yeung et al. 2009; Zerr et al. 2012b] showed
initial success in tying user tags with access control rules. For ex-
ample, Squicciarini et al. [2012, 2017b], Zerr et al. [2012b], and Vyas
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et al. [2009] explored learning models for image privacy prediction
using user tags and found that user tags are informative for predict-
ing images’ privacy. Moreover, Squicciarini et al. [2015] proposed
an Adaptive Privacy Policy Prediction framework to help users
control access for their shared images. The authors investigated
social context, image content, and metadata as potential indicators
of privacy preferences. Klemperer et al. [2012] studied whether
the user annotated tags help to create and maintain access-control
policies more intuitively. However, the scarcity of tags for many
online images [Sundaram et al. 2012] and the dimensions of user
tags precluded an accurate analysis of images’ privacy. Hence, in
our previous work, [Tonge and Caragea 2015, 2016, 2018; Tonge
et al. 2018a,b], we explored automatic image tagging and showed
that the predicted tags combined with user tags can improve the
overall privacy prediction performance.
Visual-based approaches. Several works used visual features de-
rived from the images’ content and showed that they are informa-
tive for predicting images’ privacy settings [Buschek et al. 2015; Du-
faux and Ebrahimi 2008; Hu et al. 2016; Kuang et al. 2017; Nakashima
et al. 2011, 2012, 2016; Orekondy et al. 2018; Shamma and Uddin
2014; Squicciarini et al. 2014, 2017a; Tonge and Caragea 2015, 2016,
2018; Tran et al. 2016; von Zezschwitz et al. 2016; Wu et al. 2018;
Yu et al. 2017a, 2018; Yuan et al. 2018; Zerr et al. 2012b; Zhang et al.
2005]. For example, Buschek et al. [2015] presented an approach to
assigning privacy to shared images using metadata (location, time,
shot details) and visual features (faces, colors, edges). Zerr et al.
[2012b] proposed privacy-aware image classification and learned
classifiers on Flickr images. The authors considered image tags
and visual features such as color histograms, faces, edge-direction
coherence, and Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) for the
privacy classification task. SIFT as well as GIST are among the most
widely used traditional features for image analysis in computer
vision. SIFT [Lowe 2004] detects scale, rotation, and translation in-
variant key-points of objects in images and extracts a pool of visual
features, which are represented as a “bag-of-visual-words.” GIST
[Oliva and Torralba 2001] encodes global descriptors for images
and extracts a set of perceptual dimensions (naturalness, openness,
roughness, expansion, and ruggedness) that represent the dominant
spatial structure of the scene. Squicciarini et al. [2014, 2017a] per-
formed an in-depth analysis of image privacy classification using
Flickr images and found that SIFT and image tags work best for
predicting privacy of users’ images.
Recently, the computer vision community has shifted towards
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for tasks such as object de-
tection [Sermanet et al. 2014, 2013] and semantic segmentation
[Farabet et al. 2013]. CNNs have acquired state-of-the-art results
on ImageNet for object recognition [Russakovsky et al. 2015] us-
ing supervised learning [Krizhevsky et al. 2012]. Given the recent
success of CNNs, several researchers [Kuang et al. 2017; Tonge
and Caragea 2015, 2016, 2018; Tran et al. 2016; Yu et al. 2017a,
2018] showed promising privacy prediction results compared with
visual features such as SIFT and GIST. Yu et al. [2017b] adopted
CNNs to achieve semantic image segmentation and also learned
object-privacy relatedness to identify privacy-sensitive objects.
Using CNNs, some works started to explore personalized pri-
vacy prediction models [Orekondy et al. 2017; Spyromitros-Xioufis
et al. 2016; Zhong et al. 2017]. For example, Spyromitros-Xioufis
et al. [2016] used features extracted from CNNs to provide person-
alized image privacy classification. Zhong et al. [2017] proposed a
Group-Based Personalized Model for image privacy classification
in online social media sites that learns a set of archetypical pri-
vacy models (groups) and associates a given user with one of these
groups. Orekondy et al. [2017] defined a set of privacy attributes,
which were first predicted from the image content and then used
these attributes in combination with users’ preferences to estimate
personalized privacy risk. Although there is evidence that individ-
uals’ sharing behavior is unique, Zhong et al. [2017] argued that
personalized models generally require large amounts of user data
to learn reliable models, and are time and space consuming to train
and store models for each user, while taking into account possible
sudden changes of users’ sharing activities and privacy preferences.
Orekondy et al. [2017] tried to resolve some of these limitations
by clustering users’ privacy profiles and training a single classifier
that maps the target user into one of these clusters to estimate the
personalized privacy score. However, the users’ privacy profiles are
obtained using a set of attributes. which are defined based on the
Personally Identifiable Information [McCallister et al. 2010], the US
Privacy Act of 1974 and official online social network rules, instead
of collecting opinions about sensitive content from the actual users
of social networking sites. Hence, the definition of sensitive content
may not meet a user’s actual needs, which limits their applicability
in a real-world usage scenario [Li et al. 2018]. In this context, it
is worth mentioning that CNNs were also used in another body
of privacy related work such as multi-party privacy conflict detec-
tion [Zhong et al. 2018] and automatic redaction of sensitive image
content [Orekondy et al. 2018].
The image representations using visual features and tags are
pivotal in above privacy prediction works. In this paper, we aim to
study “deep” features derived from CNNs, by abstracting out users’
privacy preferences and sharing behavior. Precisely, our goal is to
identify a set of “deep” features that have the highest discrimina-
tive power for image privacy prediction and to flag images that
contain private or sensitive content before they are shared on so-
cial networking sites. To our knowledge, this is the first study to
provide a detailed analysis of various CNN architectures for pri-
vacy prediction. Our comprehensive set of experiments can provide
the community with evidence about the best CNN architecture
and features for the image privacy prediction task, especially since
the results obtained outperformed other complex approaches, on a
large dataset of more than 30, 000 images.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Our goal is to accurately identify private or sensitive content from
images before they are shared on social networking sites. Precisely,
given an image, we aim to learn models to classify the image into
one of the two classes: private or public, based on generic patterns
of privacy. Private images belong to the private sphere (e.g., self-
portraits, family, friends, someone’s home) or contain information
that one would not share with everyone else (e.g., private docu-
ments). Public images capture content that can be seen by everyone
without incurring privacy violations. To achieve our goal, we ex-
tract a variety of features from several CNNs and identify those
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features that have the highest discriminative power for image pri-
vacy prediction.
As the privacy of an image can be determined by the presence
of one or more objects described by the visual content and the
description associated with it in the form of tags, we consider both
visual features and image tags for our analysis. For the purpose
of this study, we did not consider other contextual information
about images (e.g., personal information about the image owner
or the owner social network activities, which may or may not be
available or easily accessible) since our goal is to predict the privacy
of an image solely from the image’s content itself. We rely on the
assumption that, although privacy is a subjective matter, generic
patterns of images’ privacy exist that can be extracted from the
images’ visual content and textual tags.
We describe the feature representations considered for our anal-
ysis in the next section.
4 IMAGE ENCODINGS
In this section, we provide details on visual content encodings and
tag content encodings derived from various CNNs (pre-trained
and fine-tuned) to carefully identify the most informative feature
representations for image privacy prediction. Particularly, we ex-
plore four CNN architectures, AlexNet [Krizhevsky et al. 2012],
GoogLeNet [Szegedy et al. 2014], VGG-16 [Simonyan and Zisser-
man 2014], and ResNet [He et al. 2016a] to derive features for all
images in our dataset, which are labeled as private or public. The
choice of these architectures is motivated by their good perfor-
mance on the large scale ImageNet object recognition challenge
[Russakovsky et al. 2015]. We also leverage a text-based CNN ar-
chitecture used for sentence classification [Kim 2014] and apply it
to images’ textual tags for privacy prediction.
4.1 Preliminary: Convolutional Neural
Networks
CNN is a type of feed-forward artificial neural network which is
inspired by the organization of the animal visual cortex. The learn-
ing units in the network are called neurons. These neurons learn
to convert input data, i.e., a picture of a dog into its corresponding
label, i.e., “dog” through automated image recognition. The bottom
layers of a CNN consist of interleaved convolution and pooling
layers, and the top layers consist of fully-connected (fc) layers, and
a probability (prob) layer obtained by applying the softmax func-
tion to the input from the previous fc layer, which represents the
probability distribution over the available categories for an input
image. As we ascend through an architecture, the network acquires:
(1) lower layers features (color blobs, lines, corners); (2) middle layer
features (textures resulted from a combination of lower layers); and
(3) higher (deeper) layer features (high-level image content like
objects obtained by combining middle layers). Since online images
may contain multiple objects, we consider features extracted from
deeper layers as they help to encode the objects precisely.
A CNN exploits the 2D topology of image data, in particular, local
connectivity through convolution layers, performs weight sharing to
handle very high-dimensional input data, and can deal with more
abstract or global information through pooling layers. Each unit
within a convolution layer receives a small region of its input at
location l , denoted rl (x) (a.k.a. receptive field), and applies a non-
linear function to it. More precisely, given an input image x, a unit
that is responsible for region l computes σ (W · rl (x) + b), where
W and b represent the matrix of weights and the vector of biases,
respectively, and σ is a non-linear function such as the sigmoid ac-
tivation or rectified linear activation function.W and b are learned
during training and are shared by all units in a convolution layer.
Each unit within a pooling layer receives a small region from the
previous convolution layer and performs average or max-pooling
to obtain more abstract features. During training, layers in CNNs
are responsible for a forward pass and a backward pass. The for-
ward pass takes inputs and generates the outputs. The backward
pass takes gradients with respect to the output and computes the
gradient with respect to the parameters and to the inputs, which
are consecutively back-propagated to the previous layers [Jia et al.
2014].
4.2 Features Derived Through Pre-Trained
CNNs
We describe a diverse set of features derived from CNN architec-
tures pre-trained on the ILSVRC-2012 object classification subset
of the ImageNet dataset that contains 1000 object categories and
1.2 million images [Russakovsky et al. 2015]. We consider powerful
features obtained from various fully-connected layers of a CNN
that are generated by the previous convolutional layers, and use
them to learn a decision function whose sign represents the class
(private or public) assigned to an input image x. The activations of
the fully connected layers capture the complete object contained
in the region of interest. Hence, we use the activations of the fully-
connected layers of a CNN as a feature vector. For image encoding,
we also use the probability (prob) layer obtained by applying the
softmax function to the output of the (last) fully-connected layer.
We extract features from the four pre-trained CNNs as follows.
The AlexNet architecture implements an eight-layer network;
the first five layers of AlexNet are convolutional, and the remaining
three layers are fully-connected. We extract features from the three
fully-connected layers, which are referred as fc6-A, fc7-A, and fc8-A,
and from the output layer denoted as “prob-A.” The dimensions
of fc6-A, fc7-A, fc8-A, and prob-A are 4096, 4096, 1000, and 1000,
respectively.
TheGoogLeNet architecture implements a 22 layer deep network
with Inception architecture. The architecture is a combination of
all layers with their output filter bank concatenated so as to form
input for the next stage. We extract features from the last two layers
named as “loss3-G/classifier” (InnerProduct layer) and the output
layer denoted as “prob-G.” The dimension of loss3-G and prob-G is
1000.
The VGG-16 architecture implements a 16 layer deep network;
a stack of convolutional layers with a very small receptive filed:
3 × 3 followed by fully-connected layers. The architecture contains
13 convolutional layers and 3 fully-connected layers. The number
of channels of the convolutional layers starts from 64 in the first
layer and then increases by a factor of 2 after each max-pooling
layers until it reaches 512. We refer to features extracted from the
fully-connected layers as fc6-V, fc7-V, fc8-V, and the output layer as
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PicAlert Dataset
Image
VGG-16 CNN pre-trained on ImageNet
224×224×3 224×224×64
112×112×128
56×56×256
28×28×512
14×14×512
7×7×512
1×1×4096 1×1×1000
Pre-trained
Vectors
convolution+ReLU
max pooling
fully connected+ReLU (fc6-V, fc7-V, fc8-V)
softmax (prob-V)
SVM
Private / Public
Privacy Prediction
Figure 2: Image encoding using pre-trained CNN: (1) We employ a CNN (e.g. VGG-16) pre-trained on the ImageNet object
dataset. (2) We derive high-level features from the image’s visual content using fully connected layers (fc6-V, fc7-V, and fc8-V)
and probability layer (softmax) of the pre-trained network.
“prob-V.” The dimensions of fc6-V, fc7-V, fc8-V, and prob-V are 4096,
4096, 1000, and 1000, respectively.
The ResNet (or Residual network) alleviates the vanishing gradi-
ent problem by introducing short paths to carry gradient through-
out the extent of very deep networks and allows the construction
of deeper architectures. A residual unit with an identity mapping
is defined as:
X l+1 = X l + F (X l )
where X l is the input and X l+1 is the output of the residual unit; F
is a residual function, e.g., a stack of two 3 × 3 convolution layers
in [He et al. 2016a]. The main idea of the residual learning is to
learn the additive residual function F with respect to X l [He et al.
2016b]. Intuitively, ResNets can be explained by considering resid-
ual functions as paths through which information can propagate
easily. This interprets as ResNets learn more complex feature rep-
resentations which are combined with the shallower descriptions
obtained from previous layers. We refer to features extracted from
the fully-connected layer as fc-R and the output layer as “prob-R.”
The dimension of fc-R and prob-R is 1000.
The feature extraction using the pre-trained network for an
input image from our dataset is shown in Figure 2. In the figure,
we show VGG-16 as the pre-trained network for illustrating the
feature extraction.
4.3 Fine-tuned CNN
For this type of encoding, models trained on a large dataset (e.g.,
the ImageNet dataset) are fine-tuned using a smaller dataset (e.g.,
the privacy-labeled dataset). Fine-tuning a network is a procedure
based on the concept of transfer learning [Bengio 2012; Donahue
et al. 2013]. This strategy fine-tunes the weights of the pre-trained
network by continuing the back-propagation on the small dataset,
i.e., privacy dataset in our scenario. The features become more
dataset-specific after fine-tuning, and hence, are distinct from the
features obtained from the pre-trained CNN. We modify the last
fully-connected layer of all four network architectures, AlexNet,
GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and ResNet by changing the output units
from 1000 (object categories) to 2 (with respect to privacy classes)
(e.g., changing fc8 with 1000 output units to fc8-P with 2 output
units). We initialize the weights of all the layers of this modified
architectures with the weights of the respective layers obtained
from the pre-trained networks. We train the network by iterating
through all the layers of the networks using the privacy data.We use
the softmax function to predict the privacy of an image. Precisely,
we use the probability distribution over 2 privacy classes for the
input image obtained by applying the softmax function over the
modified last fully-connected layer (e.g. fc8-P in VGG-16) of the
fine-tuned networks (See Figure 3, second network, blue rectangle).
The conditional probability distribution over 2 privacy classes can
be defined using a softmax function as given below:
P(y = Pr |z) =
exp(zPr )
exp(zPu ) + exp(zPr )
, P(y = Pu |z) =
exp(zPu )
exp(zPu ) + exp(zPr )
where, in our case, z is the output of the modified last fully con-
nected layer (e.g., the fc8-P layer of VGG-16) and Pr and Pu denote
private and public class, respectively. The fine-tuning process using
VGG-16 is shown in Figure 3.
4.4 Image Tags (Bag-of-Tags model)
Prior works on privacy prediction [Squicciarini et al. 2014, 2017b;
Tonge and Caragea 2015, 2016; Zerr et al. 2012b] found that the
tags associated with images are indicative of their sensitive content.
Tags are also crucial for image-related applications such as indexing,
sharing, searching, content detection and social discovery [Bischoff
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Object Dataset (ImageNet)
Image
VGG-16 CNN pre-trained on ImageNet
224×224×3 224×224×64
112×112×128
56×56×256
28×28×512
14×14×512
7×7×512
1×1×4096 1×1×1000
convolution+ReLU
max pooling
fully connected+ReLU
softmax (1000 object classes)
Transfer Learning
Privacy Dataset (PicAlert)
Image
VGG-16 CNN fine-tuned on PicAlert
224×224×3 224×224×64
112×112×128
56×56×256
28×28×512
14×14×512
7×7×512
1×1×4096 1×1×2
convolution+ReLU
max pooling
fully connected+ReLU
modified fully connected layer (fc8-P)
softmax (2 privacy classes)
Private / Public
fc8-P
Figure 3: Image encoding using fine-tuned CNN: (1) We modify the last fully-connected layer of the pre-trained network (top
network) by changing the output units from 1000 (object categories) to 2 (privacy classes). (2) To train the modified network
(bottom network) on privacy dataset, we first adopt weights of all the layers of the pre-trained network as initial weights and
then iterate through all the layers using privacy data. (3) To make a prediction for an input image (privacy dataset), we use
the probability distribution over 2 privacy classes (softmax layer, yellow rectangle) for the input image obtained by applying
the softmax function over the last modified fully-connected layer (fc8-P, bottom network) of the fine-tuned network.
et al. 2008; Gao et al. 2011; Hollenstein and Purves 2010; Tang et al.
2009]. Since not all images on social networking sites have user
tags or the set of user tags is very sparse [Sundaram et al. 2012], we
use an automatic technique to annotate images with tags based on
their visual content as described in our previous work [Tonge and
Caragea 2015, 2016]. Precisely, we predict top k object categories
from the probability distribution extracted from a pre-trained CNN.
These top k categories are images’ deep tags, used to describe an
image. For example, we obtain deep tags such as “Maillot,” “Wig,”
“Brassiere,” “Bra,” “Miniskirt” for the picture in Figure 4 (note that
only top 5 deep tags are shown in the figure). Note that the deep
tags give some description about the image, but still some relevant
tags such as “people” and “women” are not included since the 1000
object categories of the ImageNet dataset do not contain these tags.
Images on social networking sites also give additional information
about them through the tags assigned by the user. We call these
tags “User Tags.” Examples of user tags for the image in Figure 4
are: “Birthday Party,” “Night Life,” “People,” etc. For user tags, we
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PicAlert Dataset
Image
Deep Tags
Maillot, Miniskirt,
Wig, Brassiere,
Bra
User Tags
Birthday, Party,
People, Night,
Life
· · · People Maillot Birthday · · · Portrait Miniskirt Bra · · ·
· · · 1 1 1 · · · 0 1 1 · · ·
Tag vector (Binary)
Private/Public
Figure 4: Image encoding using tag features: We encode the combination of user tags and deep tags using binary vector
representation, showing presence and absence of tags from tag vocabulary V . We set 1 if a tag is present in the tag set or 0
otherwise. We refer this model as Bag-of-Tags (BoT) model.
Figure 5: Tag CNN architecture to classify an image as public or private using image tags.
remove special characters and numbers from the user tags, as they
do not provide any information with respect to privacy.
We combine deep tags and user tags and generate a binary vector
representation for the tag set of an image, illustrating presence or
absence of tags from tag vocabulary V . Particularly, we create a
vector of size |V |, wherein, for all tags in the tag set, we set 1 on the
position of the tag in the vocabulary (V ) and 0 otherwise. We refer
to this model as a Bag-of-Tags (BoT) model and show it’s pictorial
representation in Figure 4.
4.5 Tag CNN
CNN based models have achieved exceptional results for various
NLP tasks such as semantic parsing [Yih et al. 2014], search query
retrieval, sentence modeling [Kalchbrenner et al. 2014], sentence
classification [Kim 2014], and other traditional NLP tasks [Collobert
et al. 2011]. Kim [2014] developed a CNN architecture for sentence
level classification task. A sentence contains keywords in the form
of objects, subjects, and verbs that help in the classification task.
Image tags are nothing but keywords that are used to describe an
image. Thus, for privacy prediction, we employ a CNN architecture
that has proven adequate for sentence classification [Kim 2014].
The CNN architecture by Kim [2014] shown in Figure 5 is a
slight variant of the CNN architecture of Collobert et al. [2011].
This architecture contains one layer of convolution on top of word
vectors obtained from an unsupervised neural language model. The
first layer embeds words (tags in our case) into the word vectors.
The word vectors are first initialized with the word vectors that
were trained on 100 billion words of Google News, given by Le
and Mikolov [2014]. Words that are not present in the set of pre-
trained words are initialized randomly. These word vectors are
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then fine-tuned on the tags from the privacy dataset. The next
layer performs convolutions on the embedded word vectors using
multiple filter sizes of 3, 4 and 5, where we use 128 filters from
each size and produce a tag feature representation. A max-pooling
operation [Collobert et al. 2011] over a feature map is applied to take
the maximum value of the features to capture the most important
feature of each feature map. These features are passed to a fully
connected softmax layer to obtain the probability distribution over
privacy labels. An illustration of the Tag CNN model can be seen
in Figure 5.
5 DATASET
We evaluated our approach on a subset of 32, 000 Flickr images
sampled from the PicAlert dataset, made available by Zerr et al.
[2012b,a]. PicAlert consists of Flickr images on various subjects,
which are manually labeled as public or private by external viewers.
The dataset contains photos uploaded on Flickr during the period
from January to April 2010. The data have been labeled by six teams
providing a total of 81 users of ages between 10 and 59 years. One
of the teams included graduate computer science students working
together at a research center, whereas other teams contained users
of social platforms. Users were instructed to consider that their cam-
era has taken these pictures and to mark them as “private,” “public,”
or “undecidable.” The guideline to select the label is given as pri-
vate images belong to the private sphere (like self-portraits, family,
friends, someone’s home) or contain information that one would
not share with everyone else (such as private documents). The re-
maining images are labeled as public. In case no decision could
be made, the image was marked as undecidable. Each image was
shown to at least two different users. In the event of disagreement,
the photos were presented to additional users. We only consider
images that are labeled as public or private.
For all experiments, our 32, 000 images dataset is split into train
and test sets of 27, 000 and 5, 000 images, respectively. Each experi-
ment is repeated five times with a different train/test split (obtained
using five different random seeds), and the final results are averaged
across the five runs. The public and private images are in the ratio
of 3:1 in both train and test sets.
6 EXPERIMENTS, RESULTS AND
OBSERVATIONS
In this section, we perform a broad spectrum of experiments to
evaluate features extracted from various deep architectures in order
to understand which architecture can capture the complex privacy
characteristics and help to distinguish between privacy classes. We
first choose the machine learning classifier between generative
models, ensemble methods, and discriminative algorithms for pri-
vacy prediction. Then, we use the chosen classifier to examine the
visual features extracted from all four deep architectures AlexNet,
GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and ResNet pre-trained on object data. We
further investigate these architectures by fine-tuning them on the
privacy data. Next, we compare the performance of models trained
on the highest performing features with that of the state-of-the-art
models and baseline approaches for privacy prediction. Addition-
ally, we show the performance of the deep tags obtained through
all four pre-trained networks and also study the combination of
deep tags and user tags in details for privacy prediction. We show
the tag performance in two settings: (1) Bag-of-Tags models and (2)
Tag CNN. We analyze the most promising features derived from
both visual and tag encodings for privacy classification. We also
provide a detailed analysis of the most informative tags for privacy
prediction. Finally, we show the performance of the models trained
on the fusion of visual and most informative tag features.
6.1 Classification Experiments for Features
Derived From Pre-Trained CNNs
Wefirst determine the classifier that works best with the features de-
rived from the pre-trained CNNs. We study the performance of the
features using the following classification algorithms: Naive Bayes
(NB), Random Forest (RF), Logistic Regression (LR) and Support
Vector Machine (SVM). NB is a generative model, whereas RF is an
ensemble method using decision trees, and SVM and LR are discrim-
inative algorithms. We evaluate the performance of these classifiers
using the features derived from the last fully-connected layer of all
the architectures, i.e., fc8-A of AlexNet, loss3-G of GoogLeNet, fc8-V
of VGG-16, and fc-R of ResNet. Figure 6 shows the performance of
these classifiers in terms of F1-measure for all four architectures.
From the figure, we notice that almost all the classifiers perform sim-
ilarly except NB which performs worse. For example, for Alexnet,
with NB we get an F1-measure of 0.781, whereas SVM obtains an
F1-measure of 0.849. We can also observe that, generally, SVM and
LR perform better than RF. For example, for ResNet, using SVM, we
get an F1-measure of 0.872, whereas with RF we get an F1-measure
of 0.848. SVM and LR perform comparably to each other for almost
all the architectures except for ResNet. For ResNet, we obtain F1-
measure of 0.872 and 0.865 using SVM and LR, respectively. The
results of SVM over the LR classifier are statistically significant
for p-values < 0.05. Thus, we chose to use SVM with the features
derived from pre-trained CNNs for all of our next experiments.
To evaluate the proposed features, we used the SVMWeka im-
plementation and chose the hyper-parameters that gave the best
performance using 10-fold cross-validation on the training set. We
experimented with C = {0.001, 0.01, 1.0, · · · , 10.0}, kernels: Poly-
nomial and RBF, the γ parameter in RBF, and the degree d of a poly-
nomial. Hyper-parameters shown in all subsequent tables follow
the format: “R/P,C,γ /d” where “R” denotes “RBF” and “P” denotes
“Polynomial” kernel.
6.2 The Impact of the CNN Architecture on the
Privacy Prediction
In this experiment, we aim to determine which architecture per-
forms best for privacy prediction by investigating the performance
of privacy prediction models based on visual semantic features
extracted from all four architectures, AlexNet, GoogLeNet, VGG-16,
and ResNet pre-trained on object data of ImageNet. We extract deep
visual features: (1) fc6-A, fc7-A, fc8-A and “prob-A” from AlexNet,
(2) loss3-G and “prob-G” from GoogLeNet, (3) fc6-V, fc7-V, fc8-V and
“prob-V” from VGG-16, and (4) fc-R and “prob-R” from ResNet. For
AlexNet and GoogLeNet, we used the pre-trained networks that
come with the CAFFE open-source framework for CNNs [Jia et al.
2014]. For VGG-16, we used an improved version of pre-trained
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(a) AlexNet (b) GoogLeNet
(c) VGG (d) ResNet
Figure 6: Performance of various classifiers (LR, NB, RF, SVM) using the features derived from all four architectures AlexNet,
GoogLeNet, VGG, and ResNet.
models presented by the VGG-16 team in the ILSVRC-2014 com-
petition [Simonyan and Zisserman 2014]. For ResNet, we use the
ResNet pre-trained models of 101 layers given by He et al. [2016a].
Table 1 shows the performance (Accuracy, F1-measure, Precision,
Recall) of SVMs trained on the features extracted from all four pre-
trained networks. From the table, we can observe that the models
trained on the features extracted from ResNet consistently yield
the best performance. For example, ResNet achieves an F1-measure
of 0.872 as compared with 0.849, 0.861, 0.864 achieved by AlexNet,
GoogLeNet, and VGG-16, respectively. These results suggest that
the deep Residual Networks have more representational abilities
compared to the other networks, and are more effective for predict-
ing appropriate privacy classes of images. Additionally, ResNets
are substantially deeper than their “plain” counterparts, which al-
lows extracting various image-specific features that are beneficial
for learning images’ privacy characteristics better. Since privacy
involves understanding the complicated relationship between the
objects present in images, the features derived from ResNet prove
to be more adequate than the features obtained by simply stacking
convolutional layers. In Table 1, we also show the class-specific
privacy prediction performance in order to identify which features
characterize the private class effectively as sharing private images
on the Web with everyone is not desirable. Interestingly, we found
that the model trained on features obtained from ResNet provides
improved F1-measure, precision, and recall for the private class.
Precisely, F1-measure for the private class improves from 0.661
(for AlexNet) to 0.717 (for ResNet), yielding an improvement of 6%.
Similarly, for precision and recall, we obtain an increase of 4% and
7%, respectively, using ResNet features over the AlexNet features.
From Table 1, we also notice that the overall best performance
(shown in orange and blue color) obtained for each network is
higher than ≈ 85% in terms of all compared measures (overall -
Accuracy, F1-measure, precision and recall). Note that a naive base-
line which classifies every image as “public” obtains an accuracy
of 75%. Additionally, analyzing the results obtained by the VGG-16
features, we notice that as we ascend the fully-connected layers of
the VGG-16 network from fc6-V to fc8-V, the F1-measure improves
from 0.837 to 0.864 (see Table 1). Similarly, for AlexNet, the F1-
measure improves from 0.82 (for fc6-A) to 0.849 (for fc8-A). This
shows that the high-level object interpretations obtained through
the last fully-connected layer helped to derive better privacy charac-
teristics. Moreover, it is worth noting that “prob” features perform
worse than the features extracted from the fully-connected layers
(on all architectures). For example, prob-G obtains an F1-measure
of 0.815, whereas loss3-G achieves an F1-measure of 0.861. One
possible explanation could be that squashing the values at the previ-
ous layer (e.g., loss3-G in GoogleNet) through the softmax function,
which yields the “prob” layer, produces a non-linearity that is less
useful for SVM compared to the untransformed values. We also ex-
perimented with a combination of features, e.g., fc7-A concatenated
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Overall Private Public
Features H-Param Acc % F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re
AlexNet
fc6-A R,1.0,0.05 82.29 0.82 0.819 0.823 0.613 0.639 0.591 0.885 0.875 0.895
fc7-A R,2.0,0.01 82.97 0.827 0.825 0.83 0.627 0.656 0.602 0.889 0.878 0.901
fc8-A R,1.0,0.05 85.51 0.849 0.849 0.855 0.661 0.746 0.595 0.908 0.881 0.936
prob-A R,5.0,1.0 82.76 0.815 0.816 0.828 0.568 0.704 0.477 0.892 0.851 0.937
GoogLeNet
loss3-G P,0.001,2.0 86.42 0.861 0.86 0.864 0.695 0.746 0.652 0.913 0.895 0.93
prob-G R,50.0,0.05 82.66 0.815 0.816 0.827 0.573 0.694 0.488 0.891 0.853 0.933
VGG-16
fc6-V R,1.0,0.01 83.85 0.837 0.836 0.839 0.652 0.67 0.636 0.895 0.888 0.902
fc7-V R,2.0,0.01 84.43 0.843 0.842 0.844 0.663 0.684 0.644 0.899 0.891 0.907
fc8-V R,2.0,0.05 86.72 0.864 0.863 0.867 0.7 0.758 0.65 0.915 0.895 0.935
prob-V R,2.0,0.05 81.72 0.801 0.804 0.817 0.528 0.687 0.429 0.887 0.84 0.939
ResNet
fc-R R,1.0,0.05 87.58 0.872 0.872 0.876 0.717 0.783 0.662 0.92 0.899 0.943
prob-R R,2.0,0.05 80.6 0.784 0.789 0.806 0.473 0.67 0.366 0.881 0.826 0.943
Table 1: Comparison of SVMs trained on features extracted from pre-trained architectures AlexNet, GoogLeNet, VGG-16 and
ResNet. The best performance is shown in bold and blue color. The best performance for each network is shown in italics and
orange color.
Figure 7: Box plot of F1-measure (overall) obtained for
the best-performing features derived from each CNN
over five splits.
Figure 8: Precision-recall curves for the private class ob-
tained using features extracted from all four architectures
AlexNet (fc8), GoogLeNet (loss3), VGG-16 (fc8-V) and ResNet
(fc-R).
with fc8-A, but we did not obtain a significant improvement over
the individual (fc7-A and fc8-A) features.
We also analyze the performance by showing the box plots of
F1-measure in Figure 7, obtained for the most promising features of
all the architectures over the five random splits of the dataset. The
figure indicates that the model trained on ResNet features is statis-
tically significantly better than the models that are trained on the
features derived from the other architectures. We further compare
features derived through all the architectures using precision-recall
curves given in Figure 8. The curves show again that features de-
rived from ResNet perform better than the features obtained from
the other architectures, for a recall ranging from 0.5 to 0.8. For ex-
ample, for a recall of 0.7, we achieve a precision of 0.75, 0.8, 0.8 and
0.85 for AlexNet, GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and ResNet, respectively.
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Overall Private Public
Features H-Param Acc % F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re
Fine-tuned AlexNet
ft-A fc 85.01 0.846 0.845 0.851 0.657 0.723 0.606 0.904 0.883 0.926
ft-A fc-all 85.14 0.849 0.847 0.852 0.669 0.713 0.632 0.904 0.889 0.92
ft-A all 85.07 0.848 0.847 0.851 0.67 0.707 0.638 0.904 0.89 0.917
Pre-trained AlexNet
fc8-A R,1,0.05 85.51 0.849 0.849 0.855 0.661 0.746 0.595 0.908 0.881 0.936
Fine-tuned GoogLeNet
ft-G fc 86.27 0.86 0.859 0.863 0.694 0.74 0.653 0.911 0.895 0.928
ft-G all 86.77 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.717 0.732 0.705 0.914 0.909 0.919
Pre-trained GoogLeNet
loss3-G P,0.001,2 86.42 0.861 0.86 0.864 0.695 0.746 0.652 0.913 0.895 0.930
Fine-tuned VGG-16
ft-V fc 86.74 0.864 0.865 0.869 0.695 0.782 0.631 0.916 0.891 0.944
ft-V fc-all 86.92 0.869 0.87 0.869 0.722 0.73 0.717 0.914 0.912 0.917
ft-V all 86.76 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.718 0.729 0.709 0.913 0.91 0.917
Pre-trained VGG-16
fc8-V R,2,0.05 86.72 0.864 0.863 0.867 0.700 0.758 0.65 0.915 0.895 0.935
Fine-tuned ResNet
ft-R fc 87.23 0.87 0.869 0.873 0.717 0.759 0.68 0.918 0.903 0.932
ft-R all 86.19 0.856 0.856 0.863 0.672 0.776 0.594 0.913 0.881 0.946
Pre-trained ResNet
fc-R R,1,0.05 87.58 0.872 0.872 0.876 0.717 0.783 0.662 0.92 0.899 0.943
Table 2: Fine-tuned networks vs. Pre-trained networks. The best performance is shown in bold and blue color. The performance
measures that achieve a better performance after fine-tuning a CNN over pre-trained features are shown in italics and orange
color.
6.3 Fine-Tuned Networks vs. Pre-Trained
Networks
Previous works showed that the features transferred from the net-
work pre-trained on the object dataset to the privacy data achieved
a good performance [Tran et al. 2016]. Moreover, many other works
used “transfer learning” to get more dataset specific features [Ben-
gio 2012; Donahue et al. 2013]. Thus, we determine the performance
of fine-tuned networks on the privacy dataset. We compare fine-
tuned networks of all four architectures with the deep features
obtained from pre-trained networks. We refer the fine-tuned net-
works of AlexNet, GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and ResNet as “ft-A,” “ft-G,”
“ft-V,” and “ft-R” respectively. For fine-tuning, we used the same
CNN architectures pre-trained on the object dataset, and employed
in previous experiments. To fine-tune the networks, we experiment
with the three types of settings: (1) fine-tune the last fully-connected
layer (that has two output units corresponding to 2 privacy classes)
with higher learning rates as compared to the learning rates of
the rest of the layers of the networks (0.001 vs. 0.0001), referred
as “fc.” (2) fine-tune all the fully-connected layers of the networks
with higher learning rates and convolutional layers are learned
with smaller learning rates. We refer to this setting as “fc-all.” (3)
fine-tune all layers with the same learning rates and denoted as
“all.” Note that since ResNet and GoogLeNet have only one fully-
connected layer, we report the performance obtained only using
“fc,” and “all” settings. The very low learning rate avoids substantial
learning of the pre-trained layers. In other words, due to a very
low learning rate (0.0001), pre-trained layers learn very slowly as
compared to the layers that have a higher learning rate (0.001) to
learn the required weights for privacy data.
Table 2 shows the performance comparison of the models ob-
tained by fine-tuning architectures on privacy data and the models
trained on the features derived from the pre-trained networks. We
notice that we get mostly similar results when we fine-tune pre-
trained models on our privacy dataset as compared to the models
trained on the features derived from the pre-trained architectures.
However, we get improved recall for the private class when we
fine-tune the networks on the privacy dataset. For example, the
fine-tuned VGG-16 network gets an improvement of 6.7% in the
recall for the private class (see ft-V, fc-all setting vs. fc8-V) over
the models trained on the features extracted from the pre-trained
VGG-16. The performance measures that achieve a better perfor-
mance after fine-tuning a CNN over pre-trained features are shown
in italics and orange color for each network. We notice that the
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Overall Private Public
Features H-Param Acc % F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re
Highest performing CNN architecture
fc-R R,1.0,0.05 87.58 0.872 0.872 0.876 0.717 0.783 0.662 0.92 0.899 0.943
#1 PCNH framework
PCNH − 83.13 0.824 0.823 0.831 0.624 0.704 0.561 0.891 0.863 0.921
#2 AlexNet Deep Features
fc8-A R,1.0,0.05 85.51 0.849 0.849 0.855 0.661 0.746 0.595 0.908 0.881 0.936
#3 SIFT & GIST models
SIFT P,1.0,2.0 77.31 0.674 0.598 0.773 0.002 0.058 0.001 0.87 0.772 0.995
GIST R,0.001,0.5 77.33 0.674 0.598 0.773 0.002 0.058 0.001 0.87 0.772 0.995
SIFT &
GIST
R,0.05,0.5 72.67 0.704 0.691 0.727 0.27 0.343 0.223 0.832 0.793 0.874
#4 Rule-based models
Rule-1 − 77.35 0.683 0.694 0.672 0.509 0.47 0.556 0.853 0.875 0.832
Rule-2 − 77.93 0.673 0.704 0.644 0.458 0.373 0.593 0.897 0.914 0.88
Table 3: Highest performing visual features (fc-R) vs. Prior works.
fine-tuned VGG gives the best performance for the F1-measure and
recall of the private class (shown in bold and blue color). However,
the models trained on the features derived from the pre-trained
ResNet yield the best overall performance (shown in bold and blue
color). Thus, we compare the models trained on fc-R features with
prior privacy prediction approaches in the next subsection.
6.4 ResNet Features-Based Models vs. Prior
Works
We compare the performance of the state-of-the-art works on pri-
vacy prediction, as detailed below, with the models trained using
ResNet features, i.e., fc-R.
1. PCNH privacy framework [Tran et al. 2016]: This frame-
work combines features obtained from two architectures: one that
extracts convolutional features (size = 24, referred as Convolutional
CNN), and another that extracts object features (size = 24, referred
as Object CNN). The Convolutional CNN contains two convolu-
tional layers and three fully-connected layers of size 512, 512, 24,
respectively. On the other hand, the object CNN is an extension of
AlexNet architecture that appends three fully-connected layers of
size 512, 512, and 24, at the end of the last fully-connected layer of
AlexNet and form a deep network of 11 layers. The two CNNs are
connected at the output layer. The PCNH framework is first trained
on the ImageNet dataset and then fine-tuned on a small privacy
dataset.
2. AlexNet features [Tonge and Caragea 2015, 2016, 2018]: We
consider the model trained on the features extracted from the last
fully-connected layer of AlexNet, i.e., fc8-A as another baseline,
since in our previous works we achieved a good performance using
these features for privacy prediction.
3. SIFT &GIST [Squicciarini et al. 2014, 2017a; Zerr et al. 2012b]:
We also consider classifiers trained on the best performing features
between SIFT, GIST, and their combination as our baselines. Our
choice of these features is motivated by their good performance over
other visual features such as colors, patterns, and edge directions
in prior works [Squicciarini et al. 2014; Zerr et al. 2012b]. For SIFT,
we construct a vocabulary of 128 visual words for our experiments.
We tried different numbers of visual words such as 500, 1000, etc.,
but we did not get a significant improvement over the 128 visual
words. For a given image, GIST is computed by first convolving
the image with 32 Gabor filters at 4 scale and 8 orientations, which
produces 32 feature maps; second, dividing the feature map into
a 4 × 4 grid and averaging feature values of each cell; and third,
concatenating these 16 averaged values for 32 feature maps, which
results in a feature vector of 512 (16 × 32) length.
3. Rule-based classifiers: We also compare the performance
of models trained on ResNet features fc-R with two rule-based
classifiers which predict an image as private if it contains persons.
Otherwise, the image is classified as public. For the first rule-based
classifier, we detect front and profile faces by using Viola-Jones
algorithm [Viola and Jones 2001]. For the second rule-based classi-
fier, we consider user tags such as “women,” “men,” “people.” Recall
that these tags are not present in the set of 1, 000 categories of the
ILSVRC-2012 subset of the ImageNet dataset, and hence, we restrict
to user tags only. If an image contains one of these tags or detects
a face, we consider it as “private,” otherwise “public.”
Table 3 compares the performance of models trained on fc-R fea-
tures (the highest performing features obtained from our previous
experiments) with the performance obtained by prior works. As
can be seen from the table, the deep features extracted from the
pre-trained ResNet achieve the highest performance, and hence,
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(a) Precision-Recall curves (b) Threshold curves
Figure 9: Precision-Recall and Threshold curves for the private class obtained using ResNet features (fc-R) and prior works.
are able to learn the privacy characteristics better than the prior
works with respect to both the classes. Precisely, using fc-R features,
F1-measure improves from 0.824 obtained by PCNH framework
to 0.872 obtained by fc-R features, providing an overall improve-
ment of 5%. Moreover, for the private class, fc-R features yield an
improvement of 9.8% in F1-measure over the more sophisticated
PCNH framework (from 0.624, PCNH to 0.717, fc-R features).
One possible explanation could be that the object CNN of PCNH
framework is formed by appending more fully-connected layers to
the AlexNet architecture and the increase in the number of complex
non-linear layers (fully-connected layers) introduces more parame-
ters to learn. At the same time, with a relatively small amount of
training data (PicAlert vs. ImageNet), the object CNN model can
over-fit. On the other hand, as images’ privacy greatly depends
on the objects in images, we believe that the low-level features
controlling the distinct attributes of the objects (e.g., edges of swim-
suit vs. short pants) obtained through the convolutional layers can
better approximate the privacy function compared with adding
more non-linear layers (as in PCNH). This is justified by the results,
where the network with more convolutional layers, i.e., ResNet
achieves a better performance as compared to the network with
more fully-connected layers, i.e., PCNH. Additionally, even though
PCNH attempted to capture convolutional features using Convo-
lutional CNN, both CNN (convolutional and object) vary in their
discriminative power and thus obtaining an optimal unification of
convolutional CNN and object CNN is difficult. Moreover, PCNH
is required to first train on ImageNet and then fine-tune on the
PicAlert dataset. Training a deep network such as PCNH two times
significantly increases the processing power and time. On the other
hand, through our experiments, we found that the features derived
from the state-of-the-art ResNet model can reduce the overhead of
re-training and achieve a better performance for privacy prediction.
As discussed before, the models trained on ResNet features out-
perform those trained on AlexNet features. Interestingly, the best
performing baseline among all corresponds to the SVM trained
on the deep features extracted from the AlexNet architecture. For
example, the SVM trained on the AlexNet features (fc8-A) yields
an F1-measure of 0.849 as compared with the F1-measure of 0.824
achieved by the PCNH framework. We hypothesize that this is due
to the model complexity and the small size of the privacy dataset
used to train the PCNH framework. For example, merging two
CNNs (as in PCNH) that vary in depth, width, and optimization
algorithm can become very complex and thus the framework poten-
tially has more local minima, that may not yield the best possible
results. Additionally, unlike Tran et al. [2016], that used 800 images
in their evaluation, we evaluate the models on a large set of images
(32000), containing a large variety of image subjects. The features
derived from the various layers of the state-of-the-art AlexNet
reduce the overhead of training the complex structure and still
achieve a good performance for privacy prediction.
Another interesting aspect to note is that, although we showed
earlier that the fine-tuned network (in this case VGG-16) does
not show a significant improvement over the ResNet pre-trained
features (see Table 2), our fine-tuning approach yields better results
compared to the PCNH framework. For example, fine-tuned VGG-
16 (ft-V) achieves an F1-measure of 0.869 whereas PCNH achieves
an F1-measure of 0.824 (see Tables 2 and 3). The possible reasons
could be that we use a larger privacy dataset to fine-tune a simpler
architecture, unlike PCNH that merges two convolutional neural
networks. Additionally, we fine-tune the state-of-the-art VGG-16
model presented by Simonyan and Zisserman [2014], contrary to
PCNH that required estimating optimal network parameters to
train the merged architecture on the ImageNet dataset.
As expected, we can see from Table 3 that the baseline models
trained on SIFT/GIST and the rule-based models are the lowest
performing models. For example, the fc-R based models achieve
improvement in performance as high as 17% over SIFT/GISTmodels.
With a paired T-test, the improvements over the prior approaches
for F1-measure are statistically significant for p-values < 0.05. It is
also interesting to note that rules based on facial features exhibit
better performance than SIFT and GIST and suggest that feature
representing persons are helpful to predict private images. However,
fc-R features outperform the rule-based models based on facial
features by more than 10% in terms of all measures.
We further analyze fc-R features and compare their performance
with the prior works through precision-recall curves shown in
Figure 9 (a). As can be seen from the figure, the SVM trained on
ResNet features achieve a precision of ≈ 0.8 for recall values up to
0.8, and after that, the precision drops steadily.
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Overall Private Public
Features H-Param Acc % F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re
Best performing CNN architecture
fc-R R,1.0,0.05 87.58 0.872 0.872 0.876 0.717 0.783 0.662 0.92 0.899 0.943
#1 User Tags (BoT)
UT R,2.0,0.05 78.63 0.777 0.772 0.786 0.496 0.565 0.442 0.865 0.837 0.894
#2 Deep Tags (BoT)
DT-A R,1.0,0.1 83.34 0.825 0.824 0.833 0.601 0.699 0.529 0.895 0.863 0.929
DT-G R,1.0,0.05 83.59 0.828 0.827 0.836 0.606 0.699 0.534 0.896 0.866 0.929
DT-V P,1.0,1.0 83.42 0.826 0.825 0.834 0.607 0.698 0.537 0.895 0.865 0.927
DT-R P,1.0,1.0 83.78 0.833 0.831 0.838 0.631 0.688 0.584 0.896 0.876 0.917
#3 User Tags & Deep Tags
UT+DT-R
(BoT)
R,1.0,0.05 84.33 0.84 0.839 0.843 0.67 0.709 0.636 0.897 0.882 0.913
Tag CNN − 85.13 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.706 0.700 0.712 0.901 0.903 0.898
Table 4: Visual features vs. Tag features.
The performance measures shown in previous experiments are
calculated using a classification threshold of 0.5. In order to see
how the performance measures vary for different classification
thresholds, we plot the threshold curve and show this in Figure 9
(b). From the figure, we can see that the precision increases from
≈ 0.68 to ≈ 0.97 at a slower rate with the classification threshold.
The recall slowly decreases to 0.8 for a threshold value of ≈ 0.4, and
the F1-measure remains comparatively constant until ≈ 0.75. At a
threshold of≈ 0.4, we get equal precision and recall of≈ 0.78, which
corresponds to the breakeven point. In the figure, we also show
the false negative rate and false positive rate, so that depending
on a user’s need (high precision or high recall), the classifier can
run at the desired threshold. Also, to reduce the number of content-
sensitive images shared with everyone on the Web, lower false
negative (FN) rates are desired. From Figure 9 (b), we can see that
we achieve lower FN rates up to ≈ 0.4 for the threshold values up
to 0.8.
6.5 Best Performing Visual Features vs. Tag
Features
Image tags provide relevant cues for privacy-aware image retrieval
[Zerr et al. 2012b] and can become an essential tool for surfacing the
hidden content of the deep Web without exposing sensitive details.
Additionally, previous works showed that user tags performed bet-
ter or on par compared with visual features [Squicciarini et al. 2014;
Tonge and Caragea 2015, 2016, 2018; Zerr et al. 2012b]. For example,
in our previous work [Tonge and Caragea 2015, 2016, 2018], we
showed that the combination of user tags and deep tags derived
from AlexNet performs comparably to the AlexNet based visual
features. Hence, in this experiment, we compare the performance
of fc-R features with the tag features. For deep tags, we follow the
same approach as in our previous work [Tonge and Caragea 2015,
2016, 2018] and consider the top k = 10 object labels since k = 10
worked best. “DT-A,” “DT-G,” “DT-V,” and “DT-R” denote deep tags
generated by AlexNet, GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and ResNet, respec-
tively. Deep tags are generated using the probability distribution
Figure 10: Precision-Recall curves for the private class ob-
tained using visual features (fc-R) and tag features as user
tags (UT), deep tags (DT-R), the combination of user tags and
deep tags (UT + DT-R).
over 1, 000 object categories for the input image obtained by apply-
ing the softmax function over the last fully-connected layer of the
respective CNN.
Table 4 compares the performance obtained using models trained
on fc-R features with the performance of models trained on the tag
features. We consider tag features as: (1) user tags (UT); (2) deep
tags (DT) obtained from all architectures; (3) the combination of
user tags and best performing deep tag features using Bag-of-Tags
(BoT) model; and (4) Tag CNN applied to the combination of user
and deep tags. As can be seen from the table, the visual features
extracted from ResNet outperform the user tags and deep tags inde-
pendently as well as their combination. The models trained on fc-R
features achieve an improvement of 2% over the CNN trained on
the combination of user tags and deep tags (Tag CNN). Additionally,
the models trained on fc-R features yield an increase of 9.5% in the
F1-measure over the user tags alone and an increase of 4% over the
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Features
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Visual private private public public public private
Tags private private private private private public
Figure 11: Privacy predictions obtained by image content encodings.
Rank 1-10 Rank 11-20 Rank 21-30 Rank 31-40 Rank 41-50
people pyjama maillot promontory jersey
wig jammies girl t-shirt mole
portrait sweatshirt suit of clothes foreland groin
bow-tie outdoor ice lolly headland bulwark
neck brace lakeside suit bandeau seawall
groom lakeshore lollipop miniskirt seacoast
bridegroom sun blocker two-piece breakwater indoor
laboratory coat sunscreen tank suit vale stethoscope
hair spray sunglasses bikini hand blower valley
shower cap military uniform swimming cap jetty head
Table 5: Top 50highly informative tags.Weuse the combination of deep tags and user tags (DT+UT) to calculate the information
gain. User tags are shown in bold.
best performing deep tags, i.e., DT-R (among the deep tags of the
four architectures).
From Table 4, we also observe that the Tag CNN performs better
than the Bag-of-Tags model (DT-R+UT), yielding an improvement
of 3.0% in the F1-measure of private class. Additionally, even though
the visual features (fc-R) yield overall a better performance than
the tag features, for the private class, the F1-measure (0.717) of the
visual features (fc-R) is comparable to the F1-measure (0.706) of the
Tag CNN. It is also interesting to note that the Visual CNN (fc-R)
achieves an increase of 8% in the precision (private class) over the
Tag CNN whereas the Tag CNN obtains an improved recall (private
class) of 5% over the Visual CNN.
In order to see how precision varies for different recall values, we
also show the precision-recall curves for the visual and tag features
in Figure 10. To avoid clutter we show the precision-recall curves
for deep tags derived through ResNet and the combination of user
tags and deep tags (DT-R) using BoT model. From the curves, we
can see that the ResNet visual features perform better than the tag
features, for a wide range of recall values from 0.3 to 0.8.
We further analyze both the type of image encodings (visual &
tag) by examining the privacy predictions obtained for anecdotal
examples using both the encodings.
6.5.1 Anecdotal Examples: In order to understand the quality
of predictions obtained by visual and tag features, we show privacy
predictions for some samples obtained by both type of features.
Figure 11 shows the predictions obtained using SVMmodels trained
on the visual features and those trained on the combination of
user tags and deep tags. Correct predictions are shown in italics
and green in color. We can see that for images (a) and (b), the
models trained on image tags (UT+DT) and visual features provide
correct predictions. The tags such as “groom,” “bride,” “wedding,”
“photography” describe the picture (a) adequately, and hence, using
these tags appropriate predictions are obtained. Similarly, visual
features identify the required objects, and a relationship between
the objects and provide an accurate prediction for these images.
Consider now examples (c) and (d). For these images, visual features
capture the required objects to make accurate predictions, whereas,
image tags such as “bruins,” “fight,” of image (c) and “cute,” “wool,”
“bonnet” of image (d) do not provide adequate information about
the picture and hence, yield an incorrect prediction. However, tags
such as “hockey,” “sports” for image (c) and “toy,” “doll” for image
(d) would have helped to make an appropriate prediction. We also
show some examples, (e) and (f), for which visual features fail to
predict correct privacy classes. Particularly, for image (f), we notice
that visual features capture object information that identifies the
image as private. On the other hand, the image tags such as “festival”
and “sport” (describing the scene) provide additional information
(over the object information) that helps the tag-based classifier to
identify the picture as public.
Next, we provide the detailed analysis of image tags with respect
to privacy.
6.5.2 Analysis of Image TagswithRespect to PrivacyClasses:
We provide an analysis of the deep tags (capturing the visual con-
tent of the image) and user tags to learn their correlation with the
private and public classes. First, we rank user tags and deep tags
based on their information gain on the train set. Table 5 shows
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(a) Private (b) Public
Figure 12: High frequency tag clouds with respect to public and private images.
(a) Private (b) Public
Figure 13: Tag association graph.
top 50 tags with high information gain. From the table, we observe
that the tags such as “maillot,” “two-piece,” “sandbar” provide high
correlation to the privacy classes. We also notice that deep tags
(objects) contribute to a significant section of top 50 highly infor-
mative tags. Secondly, we rank both the tags (user and deep tags)
based on their frequency in public and private classes. We show
50 most frequent tags for each privacy class using word clouds in
Figure 12. The tags with larger word size depict a higher frequency
of the tag. We notice that tags such as “indoor,” “people,” “portrait”
occur more frequently in the private class, whereas tags such as
“outdoor,” “lakeside,” “fountain,” occur more frequently in the public
class.
We also observe that some informative tags overlap in both
public and private clouds (See Figure 12, e.g., “indoor”). Thus, we
analyze other tags that co-occur with the overlapping tags to further
discriminate between their association with the public and private
classes. To inspect the overlapping tags, we create two graphs
with respect to public and private classes. For the public graph, we
consider each tag as a node in the graph and draw an edge between
the two nodes if both the tags belong to the same public image.
Likewise, we construct another graph using private images. Figure
13 shows portions of both public and private graphs for “indoor”
tag. To reduce the complexity of visualization, we only display
nodes with stronger edges that have the co-occurrence greater than
a certain threshold. Note that stronger edges (edges with higher
width) represent the high co-occurrence coefficient between two
nodes (in our case, tags). From the graphs, we observe that the
overlapping tag “indoor” tends to have different highly co-occurring
tags for public and private classes. For example, the “indoor” tag
shows high co-occurrence with tags such as “people,” “bath,” “coat,”
“bowtie,” “bra” (tags describing private class) in the private graph.
On the other hand, in the public graph, the tag shows high co-
occurrence with “dust,” “light,” “hankey,” “bakeshop,” “rubber,” and
so forth (tags describing public class). Even though some tags in the
graph have comparatively low co-occurrence, the tags occurring in
the private graph tend to associate with the private class whereas
the tags from the public graph are more inclined towards the public
class.
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(a) Ratio of private to public images for top 10 tags (b) Tag frequency of top 1000 tags
Figure 14: Analysis of top frequently occurring tags.
Overall Private Public
Features Acc % F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re F1 Prec Re
fc-R 87.58 0.872 0.872 0.876 0.717 0.783 0.662 0.92 0.899 0.943
fc-R+UT 88.29 0.881 0.88 0.883 0.753 0.799 0.713 0.923 0.907 0.94
Table 6: Results for the combination of visual and tag features.
We further analyze the privacy differences of top 10 private and
public image subjects. We consider “outdoor,” “indoor,” “fountain,”
“lakeshore,” and “coast” for the public class. On the other hand,
we consider “indoor,” “people,” “wig,” “portrait,” “outdoor,” “groom,”
and “maillot” for the private class. Note that since images may have
various tags associated with them, an image can be counted towards
more than one tag. Given that the dataset contains three times more
public images than private images (3 : 1 public to private ratio), we
count 3 for each private image as opposed to the public class where
we count 1 for each public image for a fair comparison. The ratio
of private to public content for a specific tag is shown in Figure 14
(a). For example, out of the total images that possess the “indoor”
tag, 60% images are of private class. From the figure, we observe
that tags except for “indoor” show a significant difference in the
inclination towards public and private classes. We also plot the
frequency of top 1000 tags normalized by the dataset size in Figure
14 (b). The plot shows that the top 200 tags befall in 3%− 30% of the
dataset with very few tags occurring in around 20% of the dataset.
We also observe that most of the tags lie below 3% of the dataset
showing the variation in the images’ subjects and complexity of
the dataset which justifies the fact that increasing the number of
images increases the challenges of the problem statement.
6.6 Fusion of Visual and Tag Features for
Image Privacy Prediction
Visual encoding and tag encoding capture different aspects of
images. Thus, we add the top 350 correlated tags to the visual
features fc-R and evaluate their performance for privacy predic-
tion. We experiment with the number of top correlated tags =
{10, 20, · · · , 50, 100, · · · , 500, 1000, 5000, 10000}. However, we get
the best results with the top 350 correlated tags. Table 6 shows the
results obtained using SVMs trained on fc-R and the combination
of fc-R with the top 350 correlated user tags (fc-R+tag). The results
reveal that adding the highly correlated tags improves the privacy
prediction performance. Precisely, we get a significant improve-
ment of 4% on F1-measure of private class over the performance
obtained using visual features fc-R. Note that, in our previous works
[Tonge and Caragea 2015, 2016, 2018] and Experiment 6.5 (where
we compare visual and tag features), we described visual content
using tags (deep tags) and combined with the user tag to achieve
a better performance. However, the combination of user tags and
deep tags (combining one type of encoding) yields a lower per-
formance as compared to the combination of user tags and fc-R
features (combining two types of encodings). Precisely, the combi-
nation of user tags (UT) and fc-R features yields an improvement
of 5% in the F1-measure of private class (refer Tables 4 and 6) over
the combination of user tags and deep tags.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive study of the deep fea-
tures derived from various CNN architectures of increasing depth
to discover the best features that can provide an accurate privacy
prediction for online images. Specifically, we explored features ob-
tained from various layers of the pre-trained CNNs such as AlexNet,
GoogLeNet, VGG-16, and ResNet and used them with SVM clas-
sifiers to predict an image’s privacy as private or public. We also
fine-tuned these architectures on a privacy dataset. The study re-
veals that the SVM models trained on features derived from ResNet
perform better than the models trained on the features derived
from AlexNet, GoogLeNet, and VGG-16. We found that the overall
performance obtained using models trained on the features de-
rived through pre-trained networks is comparable to the fine-tuned
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architectures. However, fine-tuned networks provide improved per-
formance for the private class as compared to the models trained on
pre-trained features. The results show remarkable improvements
in the performance of image privacy prediction as compared to
the models trained on CNN-based and traditional baseline features.
Additionally, models trained on the deep features outperform rule-
based models that classify images as private if they contain people.
We also investigate the combination of user tags and deep tags
derived from CNN architectures in two settings: (1) using SVM on
the bag-of-tags features; and (2) applying the text CNN over these
tags. We thoroughly compare these models with the models trained
on the highest performing visual features obtained for privacy pre-
diction. We further provide a detailed analysis of tags that gives
insights for the most informative tags for privacy predictions. We
finally show that the combination of deep visual features with these
informative tags yields improvement in the performance over the
individual sets of features (visual and tag).
The result of our classification task is expected to aid other very
practical applications. For example, a law enforcement agent who
needs to review digital evidence on a suspected equipment to detect
sensitive content in images and videos, e.g., child pornography. The
learning models developed here can be used to filter or narrow
down the number of images and videos having sensitive or private
content before other more sophisticated approaches can be applied
to the data. Consider another example, images today are often stored
in the cloud (e.g., Dropbox or iCloud) as a form of file backup to
prevent their loss from physical damages and they are vulnerable to
unwanted exposure when the storage provider is compromised. Our
work can alert users before uploading their private (or sensitive)
images to the cloud systems to control the amount of personal
information (eg. social security number) shared through images.
In the future, using this study, an architecture can be developed,
that will incorporate other contextual information about images
such as personal information about the image owner, owner’s pri-
vacy preferences or the owner social network activities, in addition
to the visual content of the image. Another interesting direction
is to extend these CNN architectures to describe and localize the
sensitive content in private images.
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